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Understanding the Keynesian Economics of 
Tanzan Ishibashi
Akifusa Fujioka
Abstract
As a journalist, Tanzan Ishibashi asserted the necessity of expansionary 
fiscal policy during the great global depression to overcome deflation. 
Therefore, Ishibashi doubtless correctly understood Keynesian economics 
to a certain extent. This paper examines the degree to which he understood 
Keynesian economics, based on his 1935 Toyo Keizai editorial titled, “The 
Upper Limit of Government Finance Expansion and Lower Limit of 
Contraction.” The results show he used the equilibrium condition “Savings 
(S) = Investment (I)” to explain how the scale of government finance is 
determined, but he did not always mention the principle of effective 
demand that states when the scale of public finance expands, the equilib-
rium condition changes. It follows that, at the point prior to The General 
Theory of Employment, Interest and Money being published in 1936, 
Ishibashi’s understanding of Keynesian economic was limited.
Introduction
Prior to World War II, Tanzan Ishibashi worked as a journalist at the eco-
nomic magazine, Toyo Keizai. After the war, he was a politician who served 
as minister of finance and minister of international trade and industry, and 
even as prime minister for a short period.1 He was also the man who intro-
duced Japan to the economic theory and ideology of J. M. Keynes in the early 
1920s.2 Hence, we can surmise that as a journalist and a politician, Ishibashi 
applied Keynesian policy to Japan’s government finance. However, it is not 
easy to comprehend the degree of his understanding of Keynesian econom-
ics. This paper therefore uses his editorial, “The Upper Limit of Government 
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Finance Expansion and Lower Limit of Contraction”3 to assess the extent of 
his grasp of Keynesian economics.
 This editorial, which commented on the statements made by Korekiyo 
Takahashi who was at the time minister of finance, was published in three 
installments in 1935. In these installments, Ishibashi used the savings and 
investment balance equation (S = I) to explain that government finance 
cannot infinitely expand, nor can it contract without limit.
 Since this editorial was written in 1935, Keynes’ A Treatise on Money4 
(1930) had been published, but The General Theory of Employment, Interest 
and Money5 (1936) had yet to be printed. Consequently, since the relation 
equation between savings and investment was utilized within A Treatise on 
Money, it can be concluded that Ishibashi was aware of that relation equa-
tion.6 However, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money had 
not yet been published, and it is possible he did not know about the principle 
of effective demand.
 When The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money was pub-
lished in Britain in 1936, Ishibashi purportedly actively promoted its 
translation by Tsukumo Shionoya, the first translator, and its publication in 
Japan.7
1. Tanzan Ishibashi’s understanding of government finance
1.1 Historical backdrop
Ishibashi introduced The Economic Consequences of the Peace,8 published 
by Keynes in December 1919, in an editorial appearing in Toyo Keizai Shinpo 
on March 27, 1920. He continued harboring an interest in Keynes’ publica-
tions and papers, and read works such as “The End of Laissez-Faire”9 (1926) 
and A Treatise on Money (1930). “The Upper Limit of Government Finance 
Expansion and Lower Limit of Contraction” was presented as an editorial in 
1935 and was written based on Keynes’ works. This editorial was published 
in three parts, titled “1. Evaluating Finance Minister Takahashi’s Latest 
Mindset” (June 15, 1935), “2. Examining the Funding of Expenditures 
Through Bonds, Currency, and Taxation” (June 29), and “3. Urgent Needs 
Fail to Suppress Bond Issuance” (July 13).
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 This editorial was an assessment by Ishibashi of the public controversy 
over implementing tight fiscal policy through a reduction in war expendi-
tures, which was an idea put forth by Finance Minister Korekiyo Takahashi10 
in the Keisuke Okada11 Cabinet during discourse that took place on May 31, 
1935. Finance Minister Takahashi’s comments garnered attention due to the 
economic and political backdrop of that time. 
 Economically, the emergence of inflation around 1935 caused by eco-
nomic recovery from the Showa Depression12 and its subsequent development 
was a matter of concern. Japan’s economy soured due to the worldwide de-
pression that occurred in October 1929 and the Showa Depression triggered 
by the lifting of the gold embargo13 in January 1930. The global depression 
progressed, taking down the United States and many other countries through-
out the world. The economic downturn induced by the Showa Depression 
recovered ahead of the rest of the globe in 1932 through expansionist fiscal 
policy. The actions taken by Finance Minister Korekiyo Takahashi of the 
Inukai Cabinet, which formed in 1931, included re-imposing the gold em-
bargo, increasing government expenditure through the Bank of Japan’s 
underwriting the issuance of bonds, and the implementation of various public 
undertakings (government assistance projects).  
 Politically, the influence of the military had been growing since the 
Manchurian Incident in September 1931. On May 15, 1932, Prime Minister 
Tsuyoshi Inukai was assassinated in an event that came to be called the “May 
15 Incident.” Thereafter, the office of prime minister was held by the former 
military men, Makoto Saito and Keisuke Okada. Moreover, in May 1933 
Japan declared the intent to formally withdraw from the League of Nations 
because the international organization did not sanction the continued exis-
tence of Manchukuo. 
 Japan’s economy grew in 1933 and 1934 through expansionary fiscal 
policy, but an inflationary trend was also seen. In these circumstances, the 
discussion by Finance Minister Takahashi on May 31, 1935 led to growing 
talk that the government was aiming for fiscal restraint focused on military 
expenditures. The military concluded that Takahashi’s comments expressed 
intent to decrease military spending, and the “February 26 Incident” was or-
ganized by young army officers the following year on February 26, 1936. 
This incident led to the deaths and injuries of several people, including the 
assassination of Finance Minister Takahashi. It was in this period that 
Ishibashi published his editorial.
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1.2 The June 15 editorial 14
In “1. Evaluating Finance Minister Takahashi’s Latest Mindset,” Ishibashi 
makes the case that the comments made by Takahashi were not an announce-
ment of fiscal austerity through decreasing military spending.
 At the time, there were those who opposed and those who agreed with 
fiscal tightening. The reasons for opposition were concern that cutting mili-
tary expenditures would shrink production and negatively impact industry, 
and that decreasing Japan’s military expenditures at a time when the world’s 
great powers were expanding their military would put the country at a disad-
vantage in the arms race. The reason for agreement was anxiety over inflation 
occurring due to the utilization of public bonds to cover the deficit in revenue 
every year.
 Prior to the discourse on May 31, Ishibashi spoke directly with Korekiyo 
Takahashi and presented the content of that meeting in a May 4 article titled, 
“Speaking Openly with Finance Minister Takahashi.” However, this article 
was subject to a rigorous revision by Takahashi. Ishibashi draws the conclu-
sion that, insofar as that article states, there is no way Takahashi is intending 
to implement fiscal restraint. He then objects to a statement made during that 
meeting by Takahashi, “Though warships themselves will not be built, the 
expense for building warships will be used in production.” If the expense for 
building warships can be used in production, then only weapons and warships 
should be built. However, in actuality if only weapons and warships were 
made, other things could not be made and thus, weapons and warships also 
could not be made. Therefore, he believes this part of the discourse is misun-
derstood by Takahashi, but the rapid swell in war expenses from 1933 
simultaneously increased the nation’s production, so the misunderstanding 
was unavoidable. In fact, there was a surplus in production capacity, so even 
if the war expenses ballooned, production could also be increased.
 However, the idea that the building of warships is productive is missing 
from the May 31 discourse by Finance Minister Takahashi. Furthermore, 
each year national savings covered the national economy, and the issuance of 
bonds was permissible as long as there was margin, but exceeding that would 
result in completely depleting the past national savings and running down 
production capacity.
 Given this, Ishibashi took the view that Takahashi’s comments on May 31 
were a correction of the May 4 misunderstanding, and did not signify an ag-
Understanding the Keynesian Economics of Tanzan Ishibashi
67
gressive cutback of government finance. 
1.3 The June 19 editorial15
In “2. Examining the Funding of Expenditures Through Bonds, Currency, 
and Taxation,” despite the fact that Ishibashi maintains Finance Minister 
Takahashi’s comments did not signify fiscal tightening, he feels the reason so 
many people miscomprehended was that most did not possess knowledge of 
government finance. In addition, Ishibashi contends that government finance 
can never be increased ad infinitum by issuing bonds to compensate. Thus, he 
explains that when using bonds for expenditures to compensate, if it is imple-
mented only for enterprises that do not bring production capabilities such as 
war expenditure, production capacity will wane since investment declines. 
Similarly, government finance can never be increased indefinitely when com-
pensating by boosting production of paper money or increasing taxes. 
Ishibashi uses the savings/investment relation equation to explain the possi-
bility of increasing government finances. Since his use of that equation is 
quite interesting from the perspective of modern macroeconomics, it will be 
discussed in detail in Section 3.
1.4 The July 13 editorial16
In “3. Urgent Needs Fail to Suppress Bond Issuance,” Ishibashi discusses the 
fact that there is also a limit to the contraction of government finance. When 
government finance contracts, unless consumption or investment grows by 
that same amount, the national economy will contract. He also uses the sav-
ings/investment relation equation to explain this relationship. Again, this 
equation is quite interesting from the perspective of modern macroeconomics 
and will be introduced in detail in Section 3.
2. The savings/investment relation equation
2.1 Generating revenue resources by issuing bonds
Ishibashi utilized the savings/investment relation equation to explain why 
government finance cannot be infinitely increased by issuing bonds. To check 
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his argument, the crucial parts of his editorial will be examined.
Excerpt 1:17
“…There is an inevitable limit to issuing bonds. Using the words of 
Finance Minister Takahashi introduced earlier, excluding the amount of 
money necessary to cover the national economy each year from each 
year’s national savings (stated a little more exactly, the amount of invest-
ments in each year needed to maintain the current standard of the national 
economy), the issuance of bonds must not exceed that remaining balance. 
The national economy will be damaged if that limit is exceeded. To sim-
plify, that relationship can be expressed using the following denotation. 
1. Yearly national savings amount = S
2. Yearly investment amount needed to maintain the current standard of 
the national economy = I
3. Amount of issued bonds = D
S – I = D is that limit. In that case, what happens if the amount of bonds 
issued exceeds that limit? If we rewrite S – I = D as S = I + D, then when 
the amount of bonds issued exceeds the limit on the right, that is, D is in-
creased, I will gradually decrease. In an extreme situation, conceivably I 
becomes zero and S = D. If government spending through bond issuance 
is only carried out for enterprises that do not bring reproduction potential 
in economic terms, such as armaments, the national economy will gradu-
ally drop further and further below the normal standard as I diminishes, 
and eventually when I nears total destruction even the current decline in 
production capacity must be supplemented…”
Excerpt 2:18
“Fundamentally, just as previously stated, when defining I as the ‘yearly 
investment amount needed to maintain the current standard of the national 
economy,’ and when the amount of issued bonds does not completely de-
plete I, that is, when the relationship S – I = D exists, the national economy 
simply maintains the present state, and does not have the ability to aggres-
sively advance. Unless S – I > D, the national economy cannot possess the 
ability to move forward. Therefore, S – I = D is the limit to which govern-
ment finance can be increased through the issuance of bonds, and if bond 
issuance surpasses this, the national economy will deteriorate, and in time 
the current bond issuance and maintenance of government finance will 
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form a demarcation line outside the bounds of possibility.7
When Ishibashi’s editorial discussion on increased government finance is as-
sessed from a macroeconomic perspective, several questionable points arise. 
Questionable Point 1: Ishibashi viewed the yearly national savings amount S 
as a constant, and assigned investment and bond issuance as the source of 
funding for that savings amount. This means if the standard of the national 
economy were established, the level of savings would be established, and 
investment and bond issuance would be determined by the savings. However, 
in macroeconomic theory, when investment and bond issuance are estab-
lished, the level of national income is determined, and as a result, savings is 
subsequently determined. His explanation differs from macroeconomic 
theory.  
Questionable Point 2: In Excerpt 1, the limit of the amount of bond issuance 
is given as S – I = D. When that limit is exceeded and public bonds (D) are 
issued, investment (I) declines and finally hits zero. Normally, investment (I) 
is private investment and separate from government policy, so even if bond 
issuance (D) increases, private investment (I) should not decrease. Hence, the 
view that an increase in bond issuance brings a decline in investment because 
savings is established contradicts the ideas of macroeconomics.
Questionable Point 3: Ishibashi maintains that if government spending is only 
carried out for enterprises not accompanied by reproduction potential in eco-
nomic terms, such as armaments, the national economy will gradually drop 
further and further below the usual level as I diminishes, but effective demand 
increases if government spending is escalated, regardless of whether repro-
duction quantity exists, so the national economy will grow.
2.2  Generating revenue resources by issuing currency or increasing 
taxes
Ishibashi also mentioned increasing taxes or issuing currency instead of 
bonds to generate revenue resources.
Excerpt 3:19
 “The above relationship is very much the same when funds for expen-
ditures are generated without relying on bond issuance by increasing the 
issuance of currency or increasing taxes. However, in this case, rather than 
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staying within the bounds of the nation’s voluntary savings, it eats away at 
consumption and has the effect of driving forced savings, so to speak. 
When done well, especially in the case of increased taxes, this does not 
touch the previously noted I or S. Conceivably, necessary government 
funds can be withdrawn from the nation’s consumption—that is, it simply 
causes forced savings. This is one reason payment of public finance 
through taxation, compared to the methods of bond issuance or increasing 
currency issuance, is said to be sound…”
Ishibashi viewed the implementation through increased currency issuance or 
increased taxes as carrying out forced savings. This leads to the following 
questionable point.
Questionable Point 4: The idea that increasing taxes brings forced savings 
without touching I or S is true in terms of investment (I), but savings (S) will 
decrease by the amount of increased taxes, and therefore there is an impact of 
forced savings. Also, investment increases if means such as an investment tax 
credit is utilized, so investment may be impacted.
Excerpt 4:20
“Finally, just as argued by scholars, paying government spending by in-
creasing the issuance of currency is nothing more than a type of tax hike. 
Furthermore, it is a bad practice that immediately causes a rise in prices. 
People should know of that incomparable harmful tax increase and bond 
issuance…” 
He presents a simplified argument that increased currency issuance causes a 
rise in prices and is detrimental. However, in a deflation it can help to curb a 
drop in prices. Therefore, the following questionable point arises.
Questionable Point 5: The impact of increased currency issuance differs de-
pending on the state of the economy, so it cannot simply be limited to an 
adverse effect.
2.3 Upper limit to the growth of government finance
In the July 13 editorial, Ishibashi once again explains the upper limit to the 
growth of government finance. The following excerpt is a relevant passage.
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Excerpt 5:21
 “Looking at how each year’s national production is appropriated, the 
majority is allotted to consumption to maintain the lives of the people, and 
the remainder to savings. For convenience, if E is used to express yearly 
national production, and C to express yearly consumption for maintaining 
the lives of the people, then C + S = E. In any society, there is no other 
form in which the yearly national production is measured. Thus, when 
government finance expansion exceeds the balance of S – I, in any society 
it can only be that I is depleted or, further, C is eroded. It goes without 
saying that the resulting harm is the same in any society. There are those 
who sometimes say that if only capitalism were abandoned, then govern-
ment finance could grow to any amount, and conclude that growth is like 
a freedom, but that is erroneous thinking arising from not knowing the 
previous rationale.” 
The same issue exists in this excerpt as in Questionable Point 1. 
2.4 Lower limit of government finance contraction
Ishibashi also examined the opposite of government finance expansion—the 
contraction of government finance.
Excerpt 6:22
“…Many pundits think the more government finance contracts, the better 
(i.e., there is no lower limit), but in fact, that is based on one major as-
sumption, which is that the absorption by the government due to the 
contraction will be consumed immediately through national revenue by 
the people. If consumption prior to the government contraction (i.e., ex-
penditure) is expressed by F, and as before C is the yearly consumption 
necessary to maintain the lives of the people, E is the yearly national pro-
duction, and P is newly established as the amount provided for productive 
use from national savings each year (i.e., the remainder after the amount 
absorbed by F is subtracted from the yearly national savings), then the 
relationship C + P + F = E is derived. Further, assuming each of these is 
stable at a certain ratio, what would happen if fiscal restraint, that is, the 
contraction of F, were to occur? The idea that there is no lower limit to 
government finance contraction takes the view that contraction of F will 
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immediately induce expansion of P or C, or both, and production will 
grow in the future, or it will help to improve the nation’s living standard. 
If this viewpoint were to always be true and could be proven, then it would 
indeed be that no limit exists on the contraction of government finance, at 
least in relation to the nation’s economy.” 
This Excerpt 6 introduces the theory that there is no limit to government fi-
nance contraction, and purports that when government finance contracts, 
immediately P or C, or both, will be caused to expand. However, whether the 
expansion of P or C, or both, will truly arise is doubtful since it is unclear 
what the driving force is that increases P or C. Therefore, the theory that there 
is no limit to the contraction of government finance is not generally possible. 
However, Ishibashi voices his suspicions about it in the following excerpt. 
Excerpt 7:23
“However, in my opinion, having said this much, undeniably many people 
already have doubts as to whether the assumption of limitless contraction 
is always true. This is because they must have experienced and remember 
actual instances when the contraction of F did not immediately cause ex-
pansion of P or C by that contracted amount. Certainly, in the event that 
the contraction of F were to immediately increase P or C by that much, for 
example, when government finance expansion in wartime abnormally 
suppresses and decreases national consumption or the conditions of the 
economic community are markedly favorable, it would feel as if there was 
a deficit no matter how many business funds are available. National con-
sumption first maintains ordinary habits, and when the demand for 
business funds starts to decline, it is unforeseeable that if government fi-
nances contract, C or P would immediately expand. Probably, a major part 
of the contraction of F would appear as decreased demand for goods and 
labor, prices would fall, and then production would drop off and lead to a 
depression…” 
This Excerpt 7 contradicts the explanation made in the argument regarding an 
upper limit to government expansion that states an increase in bond issuance 
(D) immediately brings a decrease in investment (I), as indicated in Excerpt 
1. This leads to the following questionable point.  
 Questionable Point 6: Ishibashi says that when government finance 
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expands, investment (I) immediately decreases if bond issuance (D) is in-
creased, but when government finance contracts, if consumption prior to the 
government contraction (i.e., payment), expressed by F, decreases, then in-
vestment (P) and consumption (C) must increase. However, in fact there are 
many instances where they did not increase. Despite the fact he asserts that 
investment decreases when government finance expands, his contention that 
when government finance contracts, investment does not increase is a contra-
dictory one.
 Questionable Point 6 can be viewed as showing Ishibashi’s understanding 
of government finance was as yet insufficient.
3. An explanation according to macroeconomic theory
3.1 When funding expenditures by issuing bonds
Ishibashi’s argument will be examined based on current macroeconomic 
theory. First is a look at the government’s generation of revenue resources 
when funding is sourced only through bond issuance. Denotation is defined 
as follows.
 National income = Y, Consumption = C, Investment = I, Government 
spending = G (= Government consumption expenditure GC + Government 
investment expenditure GI), Bond issuance = D, Taxation = T, Currency issu-
ance = M
 In addition, consumption function is defined as C = C (Y).
 Consumption function possesses the following kind of behavior.
 1 > dC / dY > 0, d2C / dY2 < 0
 National income is represented by the following balance equation. The 
left side is supply, and the right side is demand.
 Y = C+ I + G
 The portion not consumed in national income is savings. However, taxa-
tion is not initially considered.
 S ≡ Y − C
 Investment subtracted from this savings becomes a surplus, but when this 
surplus is used as government expenditure and the revenue source for gov-
ernment expenditure is funded by bond issuance (D), the following relation 
equation is derived.
Akifusa Fujioka
74
 S – I = D
  = G 
Thus, savings = investment + government expenditure.
 S = I + G
 At this point the value of national income is determined. Fig. 1 shows this 
relationship. Balanced national income is determined at the point the savings 
function (S) and investment (I) + government expenditure (G) intersect.
 Here, a confi rmation is made of the change that arises when government 
spending (G) increases (△G) and new government spending G* (G* > G) is 
expanded, as shown in Excerpt 1. This is shown in Fig. 2.
 When effective demand exists that is comprised of consumption (C), in-
vestment (I), and government expenditure (G), and government expenditure 
G newly increases to G*, national income also increases, and balanced na-
tional income increases from Y to Y* (Y* > Y). The new equilibrium 
condition is as follows.
 Y* = C(Y*) + I + G*
 Savings (S) also increases according to an increase in government 
expenditure.
 S* ≡ Y* − C(Y*)
 dS* / dY* = dY* / dY* − dC(Y*) / dY* > 0
 (dependent on the function form of the consumption function 1 > dC / dY 
> 0)  
 Investment subtracted from savings is government expenditure.
 S* – I = D*
      = G*
As is clear from this savings and investment relationship, when the amount of 
bond issuance (D) (= government expenditure G) increases, savings (S) in-
creases to fulfi ll the equilibrium condition even though investment (I) does 
not change. Therefore, it differs from the relationship noted in Excerpt 1, 
“When the amount of bonds issued (D) increases, investment (I) decreases 
because savings (S) does not change.”24 The conclusion derived from this is 
that Ishibashi seemingly uses the savings/investment relationship, but he is 
not utilizing the relationship that a government expenditure increase leads to 
national earnings increasing and a subsequent savings increase. If savings 
grows it means there is no longer a need to decrease investment, even if gov-
ernment expenditure increases. It follows that Ishibashi did not accurately 
use the theory of effective demand that states when government expenditure 
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Fig.1  S – I = G
Fig.2  S (Y*) – I = G*
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is increased, national earnings can be increased. 
3.2 When funding expenditures through taxation
Next is an examination of idea that when government expenditures are funded 
by taxation, consumption is decreased due to forced savings, as presented in 
Excerpt 3.
 National income is represented by the following balance equation.
 Y = C + I + G
 Consumption subtracted from national income is savings and taxation.
 Y – C ≡ S + T
 Thus, the equilibrium condition for savings/investment is as follows.
 S + T = I + G
 Based on this, the difference in savings and investment is as follows.
 S – I = G – T
 If investment is low and there is a savings surplus (S > I), government 
expenditure must surpass tax revenue to create a fiscal deficit in order to 
maintain the level of national income. It is necessary to cover this fiscal defi-
cit by issuing bonds. 
 G – T = D (> 0)
 Thus,
 S – I = D.
 When a disparity emerges between savings and investment in this way, in 
the short term that disparity can be covered by issuing bonds (or 
redemption.)
 When there is excess investment (S < I), then G < T, so tax revenue sur-
passes expenditure. In this case, there is a tax surplus, so by redeeming past 
bonds the excess in taxes can be utilized.
 In addition, if the Bank of Japan directly underwrites the issued bonds, 
then the bond issuance (D) and new currency issuance (M) are equal.
 G – T = D
  = M
 Thus, the savings/investment disparity becomes the amount of the new 
currency issuance.
 S – I = M
 Since bond issuance and currency issuance are financial developments, 
the currency market or bond market must also be examined.
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3.3 The crowding out effect
Ishibashi’s explanation that when the bond issuance amount (D) increases to 
exceed the limit of S – I = D, then investment (I) gradually decreases could 
occur when the crowding out effect exists. However, it is generally incon-
ceivable that when government expenditure is increased, investment will 
decrease exactly by that same amount to create a 100% crowding out effect.
 Investment is dependent on the interest rate (r). If the interest rate rises, 
investment declines. If the interest rate drops, investment increases. This is 
because when government spending increases, national earnings increase, 
but because the demand for capital needed for trade goes up at that time, in-
vestment funds decrease, the interest rate rises, and investment declines. For 
an even more detailed analysis, applying IS-LM analysis is recommended.
3.4 Increasing unproductive war expenditure
It is difficult to define expenditures related to military affairs. The 2008 
System of National Accounts (2008 SNA) treats weapons systems as a capital 
formation. Previous SNA viewed it as government consumption. Items such 
as warships take years to build and once completed can be used for a long 
time just as general durable goods, but even so they were viewed as consum-
ables and thus treated as government consumption expenditures.
 While quoting from the comments by Korekiyo Takahashi, Ishibashi as-
serted that, “If only weapons and warships were made, other things could not 
be made and thus, weapons and warships also could not be made.” This as-
sertion was presented in 1935; in the end the Japanese economy would later 
come to experience exactly that.
 Triggered by the “February 26 Incident” in February 1936, the Japanese 
economy began treading the path of a military state in earnest, and war ex-
penditures rapidly grew. Along with this, the metals needed for production of 
weapons and warships ran short. Since it was difficult to produce new metals, 
in 1938 the Japanese government established the Iron & Steel Distribution 
Regulation to compensate for the shortage in metal resources needed for the 
worsening war situation, lack of resources, and especially the production of 
weapons. Furthermore, the government called for the collection of non-es-
sential, non-urgent metals. Even so, given that there was still a shortage of 
metals, based on the National Mobilization Law of August 30, 1941, the 
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government announced the Metal Collection Act which came into enforce-
ment on September 1 of the same year. Through this, metals were collected 
on a large scale under the name of the war effort. As a result, factory produc-
tion machines and the like were also donated, and production in the private 
sector decreased. When the war ended, Japan’s economy was left with insuf-
ficient private capital.
Conclusion
It is clear from several editorials that Tanzan Ishibashi read works by J. M. 
Keynes and formed his own economic ideology. However, based on the edi-
torial, “The Upper Limit of Government Finance Expansion and Lower Limit 
of Contraction,” it can be said that, although in 1935 he was aware of the 
savings/investment relation equation, he was not necessarily sufficiently 
aware of the principle of effective demand.
 However, it is unclear whether Ishibashi came to understand the principle 
of effective demand at some point after The General Theory of Employment, 
Interest and Money was published by Keynes in 1936. That is because there 
is no suitable material containing theoretical content employing the savings/
investment relation equation that can be used to make a judgment, similar to 
“The Upper Limit of Government Finance Expansion and Lower Limit of 
Contraction.” Thus, determining the point at which Ishibashi understood the 
principle of effective demand is a new subject left to future research. 
Notes
1. For information on Tanzan Ishibashi’s career, refer to Hiroshi Masuda (1990).
2. In the Toyo Keizai editorial “Those Capable of Winning Wars” published on 
March 27, 1920, Tanzan Ishibashi refers to The Economic Consequences of the 
Peace by Keynes (December 1919). The Collected Writings of Tanzan Ishibashi, 
Vol. 3, p. 147. Also, refer to Tadashi Yamaguchi (1990) p. 196–198 regarding the 
Japanese translation of The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money.
3. The Upper Limit of Government Finance Expansion and Lower Limit of 
Contraction” (1935), The Collected Writings of Tanzan Ishibashi, Vol. 9, p. 
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4. A Treatise on Money I The Pure Theory of Money, 1930; The Collected Writings 
of John Maynard Keynes Vol. 5, THE　MACMILLAN　PRESS　LTD.
5. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, 1936
6. Savings (S) and investment (I) are used in “Part 3 The Basic Equation” in A 
Treatise on Money I
7. The Collected Writings of Tanzan Ishibashi, Vol. 3; Tsukumo Shionoya, 
“Ishibashi and Keynes,” separate printing, Monthly Bulletin No. 5 
8. The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, Vol. 2, “The Economic 
Consequences of the Peace”
9. John Maynard Keynes, The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, Vol. 2, 
“The End of Laissez-Faire,” London, 1926.
10. Korekiyo Takahashi (September 19, 1854–February 26, 1936) was a bureaucrat 
and politician in the Meiji, Taisho, and early Showa eras. He was the 20th prime 
minister (November 13, 1921–June 12, 1922). When Tsuyoshi Inukai formed his 
cabinet in 1931, he became the 4th finance minister and re-imposed the gold 
embargo (December 13, 1931). Finance Minister Takahashi also implemented 
government assistance projects and increased government expenditure (military 
budget) through underwriting by the Bank of Japan as a reflation policy measure. 
In the midst of the great global depression, the Japanese economy shook free of 
deflation. When Inukai was assassinated in the “May 15 Incident” in 1932, he 
was assigned as acting prime minister, and when Makoto Saito formed his cabi-
net, he remained as finance minister (5th time). In addition, in 1934 he served as 
finance minister for a 6th time in the Keisuke Okada Cabinet.
11. Keisuke Okada (February 14, 1868–October 17, 1952) was a military officer and 
politician. He was minister of the navy in the Giichi Tanaka Cabinet and Makoto 
Saito Cabinet, and after the “May 15 Incident” served as prime minister (July 
1934–March 1936). In the “February 26 Incident,” he was attacked by young 
officers, but escaped.
12. The Showa Depression refers to the depression that arose in the Japanese econ-
omy from 1930 to 1931. This was a serious depression impacted by the worldwide 
depression in the fall of 1929. The Osachi Hamaguchi Cabinet formed in 1929 
decided on returning to the gold standard and took measures to reduce prices to 
boost the global competitiveness of Japanese products. This added deflationary 
pressure to the market that resulted in the Showa Depression. 
13. Japan’s economy in the 1930s climbed out of recession and achieved high eco-
nomic growth. Therefore, the possibility of the price standard rising emerged. In 
particular, the Producer Price Index had a high rate of increase exceeding 10%, 
at 11.0% in 1932 and 14.6% in 1933. However, in 1934 it fell to 1.9%, with the 
rate of increase at a low level of 2.6% in 1935 and 4.2% in 1936. In 1937, it 
jumped to 21.4%, and in 1938 fell to 5.5%. Later, it once again rose, shifting to 
a level of around10%. 
Akifusa Fujioka
80
14. The major powers utilized the gold standard system prior to World War I. 
However, during that war, each country imposed a ban on the export of gold. 
After the war, there was a growing move to return to the gold standard by the 
United States (1919) and other countries, but Japan did not due to reasons such 
as the depression. Despite the occurrence of the worldwide depression in 1929, 
Finance Minister Junnosuke Inoue from the Osachi Hamaguchi Cabinet lifted 
the gold embargo in January 1930.
15. The Collected Writings of Tanzan Ishibashi, Vol. 9, p. 376–382.
16. The Collected Writings of Tanzan Ishibashi, Vol. 9, p. 383–386.
17. The Collected Writings of Tanzan Ishibashi, Vol. 9, p. 386–390.
18. The Collected Writings of Tanzan Ishibashi, Vol. 9, p. 383–384.
19. The Collected Writings of Tanzan Ishibashi, Vol. 9, p. 384–385.
20. The Collected Writings of Tanzan Ishibashi, Vol. 9, p. 385.
21. The Collected Writings of Tanzan Ishibashi, Vol. 9, p. 385–386.
22. The Collected Writings of Tanzan Ishibashi, Vol. 9, p. 387.
23. The Collected Writings of Tanzan Ishibashi, Vol. 9, p. 388–389.
24. The Collected Writings of Tanzan Ishibashi, Vol. 9, p. 389.
25. Tanzan Ishibashi was assuming a fixed level of natunal income. When govern-
ment expenditure is increased, national earnings increase, but to return to the 
previous national earnings standard requires decreasing investment (I). 
Therefore, under the condition of fixed national earnings, when government ex-
penditure increases, investment decreases.
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